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WRONGFUL CONCEPTION: WHO PAYS FOR
BRINGING UP BABY?
INTRODUCTION
Forty-five years ago, when Clarence Christensen sued his doctor because
he had fathered a child after having undergone a vasectomy, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court found itself confronted with the issue of whether a
contract to perform a therapeutic sterilization' was void as against public
policy. 2 The court held that public policy did not bar a therapeutic steriliza-
tion and further noted that even the few states that outlawed sterilizations
made an exception in the case of medical necessity.3 Subsequent courts have
extended this holding to elective sterilizations. 4 In light of these decisions and
the Supreme Court holdings in the last fifteen years that the rights to abortion
and contraception fall within the fundamental right of privacy,3 it appears
that states should not interfere with an individual's decision to be sterilized. It
is a decision that rests within the "individual conscience."
6
As the legality of sterilization operations became settled, the question
arose whether damages could be recovered in what are generally known
as wrongful conception actions 7-actions against a doctor to recover for the
1. The purpose of a therapeutic sterilization, whether performed on a male or female, Is to
prevent pregnancy or childbirth from aggravating any existing physical or mental health
problems of the female. Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 415, 416 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Sterilization]. Vasectomy, the sterilization procedure for men, is a short and
simple operation that is usually performed in the physician's office. The operation is performed to
prevent the ejaculation of sperm by severing and tying the vas deferens, the tube that connects
the testes with the urinary canal. For women, a bilateral salpingectomy (the surgical removal of
the Fallopian tubes) or tubal ligation (the cutting and tying off of the Fallopian tubes) prevents
the union of sperm and egg which results in conception. Sterilization, supra, at 416.
2. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
3. Id. at 125, 255 N.W. at 621.
4. Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, .- , 366 A.2d 204, 205 (Super. Ct.
1976); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 43 (C.P. 1957); see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 317-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967). An elective sterilization procedure Is
performed for such personal reasons of the patient as limiting family size or avoiding financial
burdens. Sterilization, supra note 1, at 416.
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
452-54 (1972) (use of contraceptives by unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (use of contraceptives by married persons).
6. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967).
7. This terminology was suggested in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -,
-, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174-75 (1977). This Note will not discuss cases termed "wrongful life"
or "wrongful birth" in which the plaintiff alleges that the child's very existence is wrongful in
that, had the physician diagnosed the mother's disease that resulted in the child's deformity and
informed her of the risk of having a deformed child and of termination of the pregnancy as an
alternative, the child would not have been born deformed. The distinction between a wrongful
life action and a wrongful birth action is that the former is brought by the child, whereas the
latter is brought by the parents. Wrongful conception cases are primarily distinguishable from
both wrongful life and wrongful birth cases in that the parents in the latter cases want a healthy
child, whereas in wrongful conception cases the parents do not want a child at all. Wrongful life
and wrongful birth actions have met with almost universal disapproval in the courts. The reason
given by most courts in denying these actions is that the measure of compensatory damages is
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birth of an unwanted child resulting from the doctor's misperformance of the
operation or from his wrongful guarantee of the operation's success. The
cases that addressed this question are inconsistent. 8 A trend toward recovery
has emerged, 9 however, but even these cases vary as to the extent of recovery
permitted. Recoveries granted range from pregnancy-related costs'0 to the
costs of raising the unwanted child until its majority. 1
The purpose of this Note is to review the inconsistent lines of wrongful
conception cases and to suggest an approach to the prosecution of, and
recovery under, this type of action. Part I will examine various policy factors
underlying the cause of action. Part II will explore the various theories of
recovery available to the plaintiff: medical malpractice, breach of warranty,
deceit, and strict liability. As will be shown, wrongful conception actions
have the best chances of success under one of the medical 'malpractice
theories, be it negligence in the operation, lack of informed consent, or
negligent misrepresentation. Part II will discuss the issue of damages and
will contend that parents should be allowed to recover for all foreseeable
harm resulting from the defendant's negligence, offset by any benefits of
parenthood that the defendant can prove.
I. PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS FAVORING RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
A plaintiff in a wrongful conception action has the benefit of public policy
which favors individual choice in matters of birth control. This policy is
impossible because it involves weighing the value of life against the value of nothingness. In
addition, wrongful life cases usually present a proximate cause problem because the cause of the
child's deformities is usually the mother's disease, not the doctor's failure to diagnose it. See, e.g.,
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.
2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1977), aff'd in part and re,'d in part, No. 78-560, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 2 (CL
App. Dec. 27, 1978). Wrongful conception differs in that the cause of action arises at the time of
the unwanted conception that is proximately caused by the acts of the physician. It is more akin
to a traditional malpractice action than is a wrongful life action. Compensatory damages can be
measured by placing the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in if the sterilization
operation had been properly performed. See pts. I, III infra.
Actions by siblings against physicians, alleging diminution of their share of parental love,
affection, and monetary support due to the birth of an unwanted or deformed child, also have not
met with success. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. DisL CL App. 1974); Cox v.
Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
Actions by an illegitimate child against a parent for the "tort" of bastardy, that is, fathering an
illegitimate child, have met a similar fate. See Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IM. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); cf. Williams v. State, 18
N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (rejecting claim that child's illegitimate
birth resulting from rape of mother in state hospital was caused by negligent supervision on the
part of the state).
8. Compare Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) and Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, - Man. - , 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977) granting recovery) with
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957) and Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (denying recovery).
9. For a discussion of the percentage of cases that have allowed recovery, see note I 11 infra.
10. E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 n.5 (Del. 1975).
11. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
reflected in state statutes that encourage family planning and birth con-
trol,' 2 even to the point of subsidizing contraceptives as part of state welfare
programs.' 3 In addition, public acceptance of the individual's right not to
have children is evidenced by the widespread use of birth control tech-
niques. 14
Indeed, societal attitudes regarding the sanctity of life have recently under-
gone a transformation. For example, the right to have an abortion is deemed
fundamental,' 5 and it is a decision that rests solely with the pregnant
woman. 16 Moreover, an individual's right to die has met with increasing
acceptance. 17 The elimination of criminal penalties for suicide reflects this
right.' 8 Therefore, the value of a child's birth, when unplanned and un-
wanted, cannot be said to bar an action for wrongful conception. 9
In addition, public policy regarding the regulation of the medical profession
is not furthered by allowing doctors to escape the forseeable consequences of
their negligence. 20 It has been claimed that allowing parents to recover
childrearing costs would place an unreasonable burden on physicians. 2 Yet,
12. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 145.911-.922 (subsidies for community health services
including family planning), 617.25 (legalization of the sale, distribution, or advertisement of
contraceptive materials by authorized persons) (West 1970 & Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:170-76 (West 1971) (allowing sale of contraceptives by authorized persons); cf. Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional New York statute making
criminal the sale or distribution of contraceptives to those under 16 years of age).
13. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. §§ 234.21-.22 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-1979); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 400.14b (1976); Or. Rev. Stat. § 435.205 (1977).
14. Between 1970 and 1975, over 3.5 million vasectomies were performed in the United
States. Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 Suffolk L. Rev. 25, 25 (1975). In 1975, an estimated 7.1 million
married women were using birth control pills. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -,
n.9, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 n.9 (1977).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
16. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a
Missouri statute requiring consent of the spouse or parent of an unmarried woman under 18).
17. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (as valuable incident to daughter's
right of privacy, guardian allowed to assert on behalf of daughter decision to allow natural
termination of a vegetative existence), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 7185-7195 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978) (allowing a terminally ill adult the right to
authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures when death seems immi-
nent). See generally Steele & Hill, A Plea fr a Legal Right To Die, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 328 (1976).
18. Although this may be more indicative of a step toward reality than of approval of the act,
it still reflects societal trends. Penalties remain, however, for causing, procuring, or aiding and
abetting a suicide. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.215 (West 1964); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 120.30,
.35 (McKinney 1975); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2505 (Purdon 1973).
19. "It is no answer to say that a result which claimant specifically sought to avoid, might be
regarded as a blessing by someone else." Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950,
953 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (emphasis added).
20. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. ., -, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (1977);
Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bowman v. Davis,
48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976); see W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts § 4, at 23 (4th ed. 1971).
21. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518-19, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974)
(action for failure to diagnose pregnancy in time to allow for abortion). But see Park v. Chessin,
88 Misc. 2d 222, 231, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modified, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. 78-560, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1978, at
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it seems anomalous to exonerate the medical profession from these damages in
light of the special duty owed by it to the public. "Unlike other professions,
the medical profession deals not with money or property, but with . ..life
and... death."'22 Therefore, public interest in the regulation of the medical
profession may be hampered by special judicial protection for physicians.
Moreover, it would be unjust to allow a violation of the individual's funda-
mental right not to procreate to go unremedied.2 3
A question that sometimes arises in the courts is whether this remedy
should be supplied by the judiciary or by the legislature. 24 Sanctioning
judicial activity in the area of wrongful conception presents no problem if one
views the lawsuit as a traditional medical malpractice action.2 s However,
even if wrongful conception is considered to be a new cause of action, the
judiciary's hands need not be tied. First, "[tlhe real question is not whether
there is any precedent for the action ... but whether the defendant inflicted
such a wrong upon the plaintiff as resulted in lawful damages."'26 Second, the
law of torts has traditionally been an area of judicial innovation. 2 7 This has
been strikingly apparent in many areas of tort law in the past fifteen years.28
1, col. 2 (Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978) ("Why should the medical profession be deemed to have placed
upon it 'an unreasonable burden' any more than any other profession where malpractice may be
charged?... [T]he medical profession is not 'unreasonably burdened' if held liable in damages for
the injuries caused to those who depend upon it for their very lives.").
22. Park v. Chessin, 88 lisc. 2d 222, 231, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup. CL 1976), modified,
60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. 78-560, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 2 (Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978).
23. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (CL Cl. 1978).
24. See Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. CL 1977) (radical
departure from common law in creating action for wrongful life should await legislative sanction).
The tendency to await legislative sanction has been most pronounced in the illegitimacy cases.
See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 262-63, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (1963) ("The interest of
society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching, that the
policy of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people."), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 317-18, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (1974); cf. Stewart v.
Long Island College Hosp., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (wrongful
life action).
25. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, - ' inn. - , - , 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d
41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
26. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 232, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 212 (Sup. CL 1976), modified,
60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. 78-560, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 2 (Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978) (citations and emphasis omitted).
27. "The fundamental principles of tort law were created by courts not legislatures. Where
legislatures have entered the field, it has frequently been in response to the unwillingness of the
judiciary to respond to changing times or to depart from stare decisis." Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.
2d 157, 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
Commentators have pointed out that tort law is particularly suited to judicial innovation
because the conduct involved is not likely to be deterred by advance notice and because the
variety of novel fact situations cannot be anticipated. 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 212 (1966); see
W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 1, at 3-4.
28. See, e.g., Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975) (adopting comparative negligence); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (same);
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (allowing bystander recovery for negligent
infliction of mental distress); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969)
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Courts frequently have proven themselves innovative in dealing with new
problems in the tort area and competent in handling the consequences of new
law.29
II. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
In general, the facts of each case will dictate the appropriate theory of
recovery in wrongful conception actions. In order to decide the proper theory
under which to proceed, the following questions should be answered: Was a
second operation performed which elicited evidence of negligence? Was the
patient fully informed before consenting to the operation? Was post-operative
testing done, and, if so, was it done properly? Did the physician guarantee
sterility?
A. Medical Malpractice
As noted above, wrongful conception actions are usually viewed as tradi-
tional medical malpractice actions3 0 and have proceeded under the following
theories: negligent performance of the operation, 3 1 lack of informed consent,
32
and negligent misrepresentation resulting from the negligent performance of
post-operative testing.
3 3
1. Negligent Performance of the Operation
If the plaintiff chooses to proceed under the theory that the physician
negligently performed the operation, he may face several problems in proving
his case. The first of these may be showing the physician's breach of duty in the
performance of the operation. Because the operation is performed on internal
organs, any misfeasance is not readily apparent.3 4 This problem can be
minimized, however, by testimony establishing negligence given by a surgeon
who, for example, performed a Caesarian delivery of the wrongfully con-
ceived child or a second sterilization to remedy the prior unsuccessful one. 3 5
(abolishing charitable immunity); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305
A.2d 877 (1973) (abolishing sovereign immunity); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d
771 (1972) (abolishing spousal immunity). New York has been no exception. See, e.g., Basso v.
Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976) (eliminating categories of
trespasser, licensee, and invitee in determining liability of owners and occupiers of land); Dole v.
Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1972) (allowing indemnity
recovery among joint tortfeasors based upon fault); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969) (abolishing parent-child immunity).
29. See, e.g., cases cited note 28 supra.
30. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
31. E.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Garwood v. Locke, 552
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
32. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Sard v. Hardy,
281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
33. E.g., Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ky. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwatpr Clinic,
- Minn. .-, 260 N.W.2d 169, 171 (1977)
34. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. _. - n.1, 260 N.W.2d 169, 171
n.1 (1977). Some courts, however, hold that the mere fact of subsequent pregnancy presents a
sufficient question of negligence for a jury to decide. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 310-11, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
35. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967). In this case, the court
held on the basis of such evidence that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for all damages
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A second proof of negligence problem arises from the possibility that the
pregnancy may be the result of recanalization, 36 which is not the physician's
fault. Courts, however, have generally inferred causation in light of the low
rate of recanalization in sterilization operations. 37
In addition to these proof problems, the plaintiff must overcome the argu-
ment that subsequent sexual relations are an intervening cause sufficient to
break the causal chain. He will, however, have the benefit of several holdings
to the contrary. 38 Because the underlying purpose of the operation is to enable
the patient to resume intercourse without the fear of conception, sexual rela-
tions are foreseeable and within the scope of the original risk, and, therefore,
do not break the causal chain. 39
2. Lack of Informed Consent
The plaintiff may avoid the problems noted above in proving the breach of
duty by showing that the physician failed to obtain the plaintiff's informed
consent to the operation. 40 To prove a case based upon lack of informed
consent, the plaintiff must show that the doctor failed to inform the plaintiff
of all of the risks inherent in the operation. If a patient contemplates a
sterilization by tubal ligation, her doctor must inform her of the various
methods available to perform the surgery, 4' of the possibility of natural
failure, 42 of all of the available methods of contraception, 43 and, if the
operation is being performed in connection with a Caesarian delivery, of the
higher failure rate of any method of tubal ligation when performed at this
time.44
In vasectomy cases, the patient should be informed of other methods of
contraception, of the possibility of natural failure due to recanalization,4 5 and
of the need to await post-operative testing before being assured of sterility.46 A
proximately resulting from the negligence. Id. at 463; accord, West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L.
325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945). This type of evidence, however, may have the opposite effect of proving
the absence of negligence. See Bennett v. Graves, 557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1977).
36. Recanalization involves the natural regrowth of the severed tubes. The possibility of
recanalization, though rare, does exist. Lombard, supra note 14, at 33.
37. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). The rate of failure of vasectomies is about
1%. Lombard, supra note 14, at 33 n.60. In tubal ligations and salpingectomies, the rate is closer
to 2%. Prystowsky & Eastman, Puerperal Tubal Sterilization, 158 J.A.M.A. 463, 466 (1955).
38. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967).
39. See cases cited note 38 supra; W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 44, at 273.
40. The primary question in actions based upon lack of informed consent is how much
information a doctor must disclose regarding the risks of the proposed method of treatment.
Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 1396, 1396 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, - , 379 A.2d 1014, 1023 (1977).
42. Id. at -, 379 A.2d at 1023 (1977); see note 36 supra and accompanying text.
43. In Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant advised her of the availability of only three options: sterilization, oral contraception,
and insertion of an intrauterine device. Id. at - , 379 A.2d at 1018.
44. Id. at - , 379 A.2d at 1023; see Prytovsky & Eastman, supra note 37, at
466-67.
45. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
46. This is generally considered essential in determining the success of a vasectomy. Chaset,
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physician who follows these guidelines should not be held liable for failing to
obtain the patient's informed consent. 47 Although plaintiffs may find
informed-consent actions easier to prove, the guidelines set forth in existing
and future decisions in these actions, provided that physicians follow them,
should eventually vitiate the need for further litigation.
3. Negligent Post-Operative Testing and
Negligent Misrepresentation
A similar potential for reducing the need for further litigation lies in
wrongful conception actions based upon the theory of negligent failure to
carry out post-operative testing. 48 Such actions will serve to standardize the
accepted practice in the medical profession with respect to the number of tests
and the intervals between tests that are necessary to ensure sterility.
If a theory of negligent post-operative testing is appropriate under the
circumstances, the plaintiff also should be able to combine this theory with a
negligent misrepresentation theory. 49 An action based upon both theories
should succeed if the plaintiff can show that the physician told him that
post-operative testing was successful and that the plaintiff was sterile, and
that, in reliance on the physician's representation which subsequent testing
proves was false, the plaintiff and his wife resumed sexual relations without
the use of contraceptives.5 0
Male Sterilization, 87 J. Urology 512, 515 (1962); Lombard, supra note 14, at 33 (patient should
not be considered surgically sterile until negative semen analysis is obtained). Testimony to the
contrary, such as that given in Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 249, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (1964),
seems outdated. See Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ky. 1971) (expert testimony that
performing three post-operative tests for sterility is standard practice following vasectomy and Is
necessary to determine whether the operation was su:cessful).
47. One court has held that the physician's duty to disclose should be based upon a reasonable
man standard, not a professional standard, and must be measured from the plaintiff's viewpoint
as to materiality, not the doctor's. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, -, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022
(1977). This eliminates the need for expert testimony to establish the materiality of the Informa-
tion. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 284, 522 P.2d 852, 861, qoff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530
P.2d 334 (1975).
The Sard court, however, adopted an objective test of causation. The plaintiff had to show
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have consented to the treatment if
fully informed, not that the plaintiff herself would not have consented. 281 Md. at-, 379 A.2d
at 1025. Adoption of the objective standard precluded the plaintiff's hindsight testimony as to
what she would have done from being dispositive.
48. For an example of an action based on this theory, see Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
- Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
49. An action for negligent misrepresentation is based upon the plaintiff's justifiable reliance
on representations which the defendant should have known to be false had he exercised
reasonable care. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 107, at 704.
50. Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ky. 1971) (assurances that operation had
resulted in sterility); see Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, . Minn. - , - , 260 N.W.2d 169, 171
(1971); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex. 1972). As to actions based upon negligent
post-operative care and misrepresentation in cases of tubal ligation, see Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 43, 356 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1976) (sexual relations resumed in reliance on
negligently read post-operative reports); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1974) (post-operative pathology report revealed that operation may not have been success-
ful).
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One advantage of an action based upon misrepresentation is that it elimi-
nates the need to prove negligence in the performance of the operation by
limiting the plaintiff's case to the post-operative phase. A second advantage is
that proof of plaintiff's case will normally be easier in a negligent misrep-
resentation action than in an action for deceit. Although the plaintiff in one
reported case did proceed on a deceit theory by alleging that the defendant
knew that his assurances of sterility were false, 5 ' most plaintiffs are discouraged
from doing so because of the difficulty of proving that the defendant had the
fraudulent intent necessary to sustain an action for deceit. 2
If the plaintiff proceeds under a theory of negligent misrepresentation,
however, he must show that he had a justifiable right to rely on the superior
knowledge of the expert.5 3 In determining the patient's right to rely upon the
physician's word, it is important to distinguish the physician's express rep-
resentations, which he indicates are justified by the underlying facts gleaned
in the course of treatment, from his mere expressions of opinion. Because
physicians may differ as to an opinion, and because their actual knowledge of
the true facts cannot, therefore, be inferred, the patient may not justifiably
rely upon the physician's opinion.5 4
B. Breach of Warranty
Expressions of opinion must also be distinguished from warranties of
success which may form the basis of a breach of contract action against a
physician.5 5 If the plaintiff can prove that the physician expressly warranted
certain results, he may gain several advantages by bringing a breach of
warranty action. First, proof of the existence of a contract to guarantee
sterility would obviate the problem of proving negligence in the operation.5 6
51. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (19671.
52. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (defendant's demurrer
allowed because complaint did not allege fraudulent intent); see W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 107,
at 700-01.
53. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 109, at 727; see Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D 2d 80, 83, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1977), aff'd in part and re-,d in part, No. 78-650, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28,
1978, at 1, col. 2 (Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1978). In Park, the plaintiffs' first child had died from a
genetic disease. The defendant obstetrician knew that the plainuffs would rely on his assurances
that the disease was not hereditary. The plaintiffs so relied, and their second child was born
with the same fatal disease.
54. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 109, at 720-21.
55. J. Calamari & 3. Perillo, Law of Contracts § 2-6, at 29-30 (2d ed 1977).
56. The subsequent parenthood would be proof of the breach of warranty of sterility. An
interesting issue which has not yet arisen in the vasectomy cases involves a demand by the
defendant that the plaintiff undergo a paternity test to account for the possibility that te child
was fathered by a person other than the plaintiff. Paternity tests do not establish paternity but
can rule out the possibility thereof. Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ark. 244, 246-47, 478 S.W.2d
423, 425 (1972); Schleimer v. Swann, 93 Misc. 2d 520, 521, 402 N.Y.S.2d 897. 898 (Fain. Ct.
1978). A newly developed blood test, however, has proven to be 95'7 effective in establishing
paternity. Graneili, Blood Type Test Is Changing the Pattern in Paternity Suits, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
2, 1978, at 9, col. 1. Although many courts may be ill-disposed to allow establishment of a child's
illegitimacy in the courtroom (the common law presumes all children born in wedlock to b
legitimate), this reluctance should be tempered by a realization of the possible consequences
involved for the defendant physician in the lawsuit. See generally Sterilization. supra note 1, at
434 n.72.
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In addition, the plaintiff generally has the advantage of a longer statute of
limitations in contract than he has in tort.57
A breach of warranty action, however, may pose some problems for the
plaintiff. Because a physician's statements as to the proper course of treat-
ment ordinarily do not give rise to guarantees, 58 a patient must prove at least
a specific promise to accomplish a particular result over and above a general
expression of opinion or reassurance.5 9 Some courts go further and require
proof of a separate consideration to support the alleged promise. 60 These
57. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 413.120, .140 (1972 & Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§
213(2), 214(6), 214-a (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.16.040, .130
(1962). Many courts, however, have come to the aid of plaintiffs who sue in tort and have a
statute of limitations problem. They do so by applying the time of discovery rule, whereby the
statute begins to run when the injury is, or reasonably should have been, discovered, instead of
the time of damage rule, whereby the statute runs from the time the injury actually occurs. Under
the time of discovery rule, the statute in a wrongful conception action begins to run when the
woman, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, discovers, or should have discovered,
her pregnancy. Bishop v. Byrne 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (applying West Virginia
law); Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459
S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947); Teeters v. Currey,
518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974). The same rule has been applied in vasectomy cases. See
Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1971); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
1972).
In New York, the time of discovery rule is limited to cases involving foreign objects left In the
patient's body. Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). In Paul v. State, 389 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Ct. Cl. 1976), aff'd, 59 A.D.2d 800, 398
N.Y.S.2d 768 (1977), plaintiff's unsevered Fallopian tube was held to be a foreign object which
tolled the running of the statute of limitations until she discovered her pregnancy. Accord,
Merced v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 553, 391 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1977). In
Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974), however, the court held that
an allegation of an improperly performed vasectomy based upon lack of informed consent does
not toll the statute of limitations because the foreign object rule applies only to traditional
negligence and contract actions and not to informed consent actions which are an offshoot of the
law of assault and battery.
58. See Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); W. Prosser, supra note 20,
§ 32, at 162; Note, Reassurance or Contract: The Physician Caught Between the Scylla and the
Charybdis, 41 U. Mo. K.C. L. Rev. 118 (1972). "[C]onsidering the unpredictability of medical
results and the differences in individual patients, it is unlikely that the physician of integrity can
in good faith promise a particular outcome. Also, some patients are prone subjectively to
transform hopeful expressions of opinion into hard promises, particularly following an undesir-
able result." Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, - , 379, A.2d 1014, 1026 (1977).
59. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Depenbrok v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, 79 Cal. App. 3d 167, 171, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1978); Custodlo v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 314-15, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470-71 (1967); Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So.
2d 245, 246-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 156, 352 N.Y.S.2d
834, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Two cases which exemplify the difficulty of showing that particular
statements are promises rather than expressions of opinion are Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d
377, 381 (Ky. 1971) (defendant's assurance that vasectomy was a "foolproof thing, 100%" held to
be an expression of professional opinion) and Stephens v. Spiwak, 61 Mich. App. 647, 648-49,
233 N.W.2d 124, 125-26 (1975) (even if plaintiffs had proved the existence of a contract, court
held that advice that chances of wife becoming pregnant after husband's vasectomy were "one in
a million" would not be basis of breach of contract action when wife became pregnant).
60. Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d 60, 62 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 349
A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1975); Rogala v. Silva, 16 II. App. 3d 63, 65, 305 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1973). One
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problems generally militate against bringing a wrongful conception action
based upon breach of warranty.
C. Strict Liability
In the absence of one of the above theories of liability, it has been suggested
that a physician be held strictly liable for an unsuccessful sterilization
operation. 61 Strict liability is ordinarily appropriate if there is a discrepancy
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's abilities to protect against loss.
62
For example, in the case of wrongful conception, unlike many other injuries
resulting from medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot obtain insurance to
protect against unwanted children caused by an unsuccessful sterilization.
63
In fact, the plaintiff does not even expect the untoward result, whereas the
defendant is aware of the risk of failure and can protect against his misper-
formance of the operation through medical malpractice insurance.
Nevertheless, a strict liability theory seems inappropriate for wrongful
conception cases. Although a recognized attribute of strict liability is the
spreading of loss among consumers," risk spreading in the area of steriliza-
tion will only contribute to further increases in soaring medical costs because
the increased malpractice insurance premiums65 will be passed on to patients
through higher medical fees. If the cause of action is based upon strict
liability, medical malpractice insurance premiums very likely would rise
uniformly, at least among all physicians who perform sterilization surgery,
whereas if plaintiffs must prove negligence or breach of warranty, the
increased premiums would be limited to the individual culpable physicians.
Moreover, because the negligence and strict liability standards will have these
different effects upon malpractice insurance premiums, physicians may be
more likely to exercise greater care in sterilization procedures if a negligence
standard is applied.
In addition, strict liability is most appropriate in the context of the sale of
products, 66 because the manufacturer at least implicitly represents that the
product is properly made and fit for use.6 7 This is not the case with
court took a modified approach and required proof of a separate consideration only when the
alleged warranty was made after the operation. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, -, 379
A.2d 1014, 1026 (1977).
61. Comment, Strict Liability: A "Lady in Waiting"for Wrongful Birth Cases, 11 Cal. W. L.
Rev. 136, 151-58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "Lady in Waiting"].
62. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 75, at 494-95.
63. See Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The
Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 401, 424-25 (1974
(with the increase in injuries resulting from medical treatment, many individuals are turning to the
courts for protection because of lack of relief from other sources).
64. "Lady in Waiting", supra note 61, at 151; see W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 75,.at 495.
65. Between 1960 and 1970, premiums paid by surgeons for malpractice insurance rose
949.2%, and for other physicians 540.8%. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973
Report 5.
66. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 36, 539 P.2d 584, 588 (1975); Milau
Assocs. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 488-89, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251-52, 398
N.Y.S.2d 882, 885-87 (1977) (reaffirming distinction between sales of services and sales of
products); W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 104, at 679-80.
67. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 97, at 651.
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physicians, who are not guarantors of their services. 68 Generally, courts are
reluctant to extend strict liability to the area of services. 69 In addition to tile
difference in the representation given, cases involving personal services do not
present the same kinds of problems of proving negligence as do cases
involving mass production of goods for sale. 70 It is this proof problem that
renders strict liability more appropriate in the latter cases.
III. DAMAGES
The issue of damages in the area of wrongful conception has been the
subject of considerable controversy. A number of courts have denied recovery
on the grounds that damages were nonexistent, inappropriate, or incapable of
measurement. 71 In addition, even courts granting recovery have disagreed as
to the extent of damages recoverable. 7
2
A. The Existence and Propriety of Damages
Courts that have denied recovery on the ground that no damage in fact
resulted, reasoned that the birth of a child, no matter how unwanted or
unplanned, is, nevertheless, a blessed event.7 3 Yet, it seems strange to say
that a person who undergoes a sterilization operation for the very purpose of
preventing parenthood has not only suffered no damage upon becoming a
parent, but has in fact been blessed. 74 In light of a manifest public policy
68. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
69. See cases cited note 66 supra. Cases of the failure of oral contraceptives to prevent
conception provide greater potential for success in strict liability actions because the sale of a
product is involved. "Lady in Waiting", supra note 61, at 152-53. Furthermore, the package
inserts that accompany the product represent that the pills are properly manufactured. See,
e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., Detailed Patient Labeling 1 (1977) (on file with Fordlain Law
Review) ("Each tablet contains 1 mg norethindrone and 0.05 mg mestranol.'); Medical Economics
Co., Physician's Desk Reference 922, 1579 (31st ed. 1977). The package inserts, however, also
warn the consumer that the pills are properly used only under her physician's supervision. E.g.,
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., Detailed Patient Labeling 1 (1977). For a discussion of a pharma-
cist's negligence in filling a prescription for oral contraceptives, see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
70. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 36, 539 P.2d 584, 588 (1975).
71. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (lack of damages, impossibility of measuring
damages, and fear of emotional injury to child); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P.
1957) (lack of damages); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (lack of injury
and impossibility of ascertaining damages), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (no damage); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (physician should not bear costs of raising child).
72. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (unmitigated
recovery for all damages proximately caused); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975)
(recovery limited to pregnancy-related costs); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -,
260 N.W.2d 169 (1977) (recovery for all damages proximately caused, offset by the benefits of
parenthood).
73. "[T]he jury may well have concluded that appellants suffered no damage in the birth of a
normal, healthy child . . . and that the cost incidental to such birth was far outweighed by tile
blessing of a cherished child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of conception and birth." Ball
v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964).
74. "There is no justification for holding . . . that the birth of an 'unwanted' child is a
'blessing.' The birth of such a child may be a catastrophe not only for the parents and the child
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supporting the right not to have children, 7 5 it seems clear that the unwilling
parent has suffered actual damage through the birth of an unwanted child.
More enlightened courts have found the existence of emotional, health-
related, or financial damages. 7 6
A second ground for denying recovery arises from the fear of potential
emotional injury to the child if it someday learns that it was unwanted.77 This
seems a poor reason to bar recovery; the chances that a child will suffer
emotional injury on learning that he was unplanned are not necessarily
greater simply because his parents have brought a wrongful conception
action. 78 Furthermore, a child is not necessarily unloved merely because its
birth was once unwanted. 79 Thus, so long as the parents lovingly raise the
unplanned child, the danger of emotional trauma to the child is not as great as
the proponents of the emotional injury argument advocate.8 0
As a third basis for declining to award damages, some courts object to the
idea that the plaintiff is enjoying the benefits of parenthood while the
defendant bears the costs. 8 I These courts are misguided in their focus on
injustice to the tortfeasor, for
[tihe question is not whether a doctor should be forced 'to pay for the satisfaction and
joy and affection which normal parents would ordinarily have in the rearing and
education of a healthy child.' The question is whether a negligent doctor should be held
responsible for the consequences of his negligence.8 2
The answer is that the public interest in regulating the medical profession will
be impaired if doctors escape liability for their negligent acts.8 3
B. The Measurement of Damages
Other courts may admit that damages exist but deny recovery because they
find the damages impossible to measure.8 4 These courts advance the argument
that the intangible benefits of parenthood and nonparenthood cannot be
measured and weighed against each other to arrive at the appropriate
compensatory damages. 8 s Although the benefits of parenthood are a valid
itself, but also for previously born siblings." Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). For a discussion of the
siblings' cause of action, see note 7 supra.
75. See Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (notion of
compensation for physician's negligence in facilitating birth of an unwanted child is no more
offensive than the idea of birth control); notes 5-6, 12-16 supra and accompanying text
76. For a discussion of cases in which these damages were found, see note 111 infra
77. 9 Utah L. Rev. 808, 811-12 (1965).
78. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic. - ' Minn. 260 N\V.2d 169. 173 (1977).
79. See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970,.
80. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967)
81. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (C.P. 1957); Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518-19, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974) (failure to diagnose pregnancy.
82. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Cir. App. 1972), rev'd, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973)).
83. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Terrell v, Garcia, 496 S.W2d
124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
85. In so holding, these courts adopted the reasoning of the wrongful life cases exemplified by
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), discussed at note 7 supra.
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concern, they should be used only to offset the plaintiff's recovery rather than
to deny recovery altogether. A plaintiff should be compensated for the
damages proximately caused by the negligence, which, in addition to
pregnancy-related expenses, include the costs of raising the wrongfully con-
ceived child until its majority. 86 These latter costs are readily calculable and
present no problem in the measurement of damages once liability is estab-
lished.8 7 They are not too speculative to measure, for actuaries regularly
make such calculations to assist estate planners and insurance companies, 88
and courts and juries are frequently called upon to measure damages in cases
of intangible injuries such as mental distress and loss of consortium. 89
Moreover, the claim that damages are incapable of measurement ignores
the distinction between uncertainty as to the fact of damage, which precludes
recovery, and uncertainty as to the amount of damage, which does not. 90 The
wrongdoer should not be relieved of liability because the nature of his tortious
conduct precludes the ascertainment of the amount of damages with cer-
tainty.9 1 The problems of uncertainty should be placed on the wrongdoer
rather than on the innocent party. 92
C. The Extent of Damages Recoverable
and the Benefits Ride
Once it is settled that problems in awarding damages should not bar an
action for wrongful conception, the next question is what types of damages
are recoverable. One approach is to limit damages to pregnancy-related
expenses, which may include medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and
suffering, and the spouse's loss of consortium. 93 This approach, however,
seems arbitrary; "[t]here is no discernible reason for allowing recovery for
these relatively minor 'damages' and denying recovery for the substantial costs
of raising and educating a child." 94
86. Wrongful conception cases usually present no proximate cause problem. See notes 7,
38-39 supra and accompanying text. When a person undergoes an operation for the purpose of
sterilization, it is self-evident that negligence may cause the occurrence of a subsequent preg-
nancy.
87. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520-21 (1971) (costs of
raising a child to.majority are calculated routinely in countless cases).
88. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 161, 404 N Y.S.2d 950, 952 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
89. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952)
(mental distress); Shreve v. Faris, 144 W. Va. 819, 111 S.E.2d 169 (1959) (loss of consortium);
W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 12, at 50-51.
90. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-66 (1931);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., .73 U.S. 359, 378-79 (1927); Troppl v,
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260-62, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520-21 (1971); Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y.
15, 20, 19 N.E.2d 661, 664 (1939).
91. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
92. Id.
93. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 n.5 (Del. 1975) (recovery limited to medical
expenses, pain and suffering of pregnancy, and loss of consortium); see Garwood v. Locke, 552
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (recovery for medical expenses only damage issue discussed). It
is a different matter, however, if pregnancy-related expenses are the only damages sought.
Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, - Mich. App. -, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978).
94. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
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The pregnancy-related costs approach is also inconsistent. If childrearing
costs are not recoverable because parenthood, under any circumstances,
cannot be recognized as damaging, 9" consistency would demand that the
ordeal of pregnancy be recognized as the necessary means to parenthood
which parents in normal circumstances readily endure. 96 Thus, to hold that
one part of the childrearing process causes damage, while the other does not,
is contradictory. Moreover, as shown above, parenthood is not necessarily a
blessed event.97
Another approach to awarding damages is to permit recovery for all
expenses proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, including the
costs of childrearing until majority, without any offset for the benefits of
parenthood. This approach was followed in Custodio v. Bauer,98 in which the
tubal ligation that the defendant performed on the plaintiff for both thera-
peutic and elective reasons was unsuccessful. 99 The court characterized the
recovery granted as "replenish[ing] the family exchequer so that the new
arrival [would] not deprive the other members of the family of what was
planned as their just share of the family income," 0 0 rather than as merely
compensating for the child's birth. The measure of "replenishment," in line
with California law,' 10 was held to include all expenses proximately caused
by the negligence.' 0 2 This seems an appropriate method for measuring
compensatory damages in that it restores the plaintiff to the position he or she
would have been in were it not for the defendant's negligence. 10 3
Although the pregnancy-related costs approach is contradictory and fails to
compensate the plaintiff for all injuries proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence,' 0 4 unmitigated recovery for all damages proximately caused,
including the costs of raising the child to majority, also seems unjust. The
originally unwanted child will, in most cases, eventually become a source of
some joy to the parents. It is therefore suggested that courts apply the
Restatement of Torts "benefits" rule, 105 which provides for mitigation of
95. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12-14 (Del. 1975).
96. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
97. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text
98. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
99. In addition to having given birth to nine children, plaintiff had a bladder and kidney
condition which would have been aggravated by another pregnancy. Id. at 307-08, 325, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 466, 477.
100. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
101. Cal. Civ. Code § 3333 (West 1970) (except for breach of contract, and unless otherwise
provided, measure of damages is the amount that will compensate for all detriment proximately
caused).
102. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477; accord, Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp.
460, 464-65 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (though no recovery sought for childrearing costs); West v.
Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 611 (1945) (same); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.
2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (affirming general verdict of $450,000).
103. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 2, at 7.
104. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
105. "Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or his property
and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is
equitable." Restatement of Torts § 920 (1939).
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damages when the tortfeasor has conferred a benefit upon his victim. 0 6
One objection raised to the benefits rule is that it is impossible to place a
dollar value on the intangible satisfaction, joy, and companionship flowing
from the parent-child relationship. 0 7 This objection, however, is not valid
because calculations as to the value of a child's services and, in some states,
companionship, are regularly made in actions involving the wrongful death of
children. '0 8
The major advantage of the benefits rule is that it can take into account the
facts of each case and thereby provide needed flexibility in the calculation of
damages.' 0 9 In wrongful conception cases, the "value" of parenthood will
vary according to the individual's reasons for wanting the sterilization opera-
tion. Thus, fairness to both parties dictates that these reasons be considered in
determining the benefits of parenthood. 1 0
The patient in wrongful conception cases may undergo sterilization for
therapeutic, emotional, family size, or financial reasons, or some combination
106. Cases applying the benefits rule include: Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126,
366 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971)
(negligent filling of prescription for oral contraceptive!;); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
Minn .... 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336
(Law Div. 1975); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
The question has arisen whether the failure to have an abortion or to have the child adopted Is a
failure to mitigate damages that precludes recovery. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257-60, 187 N.W.2d
511, 519-20 (1971); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162-63, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 46 (C.P. 1957). As to adoption, this suggestion
"is not consistent with the very stability of the family" relied upon by opponents of an action for
wrongful conception. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The law
considers that rearing by the natural parents furthers the child's best interests. Once the child Is
born, many parents, out of fear of the psychological consequences of adoption for both the child
and themselves, feel it their duty to raise the child lovingly. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at
259, 187 N.W.2d at 520. In the case of abortion, conversion of the right to have an abortion into
an obligation would constitute a gross invasion of privacy. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d at 163,
404 N.Y.S.2d at 954. A plaintiff's personal opposition to abortion is not necessarily inconsistent
with undergoing a sterilization operation. Id. at 163 n.6, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954 n.6. A tortfeasor
must accept his victim's individual propensities, and cannot insist that the victim proceed with
something that violates her personal beliefs. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at 260, 187 N.W.2d
at 520. Additionally, "unplanned" does not mean "unloved". Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d
503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at 258, 187 N.W.2d at
519.
107. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974).
108. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260-61, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520-21 (1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, - , 260 N*4.W.2d 169, 176 (1977). In Stephens v.
Spiwak, 61 Mich. App. 647, 650-51, 233 N.W.2d 124, 126 (1975), the court agreed with the
defendant's argument that the benefits emanating from an unplanned child are basically the same
as the damages resulting from the wrongful death of a child. See generally Lipsig, Wronghid
Death Damages, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
109. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971).
110. It should be emphasized that the benefits rule involves a question of mitigation after the
determination of damages, not a balancing process to determine their existence. See note 105
supra.
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thereof."' When the purpose is solely therapeutic, the subsequently born
child is not necessarily unwanted. In these cases, compensation may be
awarded for the unexpected alteration in family status and lifestyle. '" 2
However, the jury should be free to conclude that the child was wanted and
that, therefore, the benefit of parenthood entirely offsets the health problem
involved."13 Nevertheless, if the pregnancy was difficult or seriously aggra-
111. Not all cases mention the reason for the sterilization operation. The following list,
therefore, deals only with those that do.
Single reasons:
Therapeutic: Depenbrok v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 167,
144 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1978); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, - Mich. App.
- 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978); Martineau v. Nelson, -Mlinn. -, 247 N.W.2d 409
(1976); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Milde v. Leigh,
75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio SL 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d
496 (1976); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974).
Emotional: Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Hays v. Hall,
488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
Family size: Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d 60 (Colo. CL App. 1975); Bennett v. Graves,
557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1977); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.Zd
169 (1977); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. CL 1974); Terrell
v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
Multiple reasons:
Therapeutic and financial: Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
Therapeutic and family size: Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
Therapeutic and emotional: Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
Emotional and family size: Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
Financial and family size: Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
One study disclosed the following approximate breakdown of the reasons why women undergo
tubal ligation:
Therapeutic only: 55.2%
Family size only: 33.3%
Emotional onlv. 6.9%
Combination: .1%
Other: 4.4%
99.9%
Prystowsky & Eastman, supra note 37, at 463.
Of the cases involving multiple reasons for sterilization, only Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247,
391 P.2d 201 (1964) and Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957) denied recovery. In
the cases in which the operation was performed for only one reason, the breakdown of recovery is
as follows: therapeutic-recovery approved, but not necessarily granted, in six of seven cases;
emotional-both causes of action allowed over statute of limitations defenses; family size--
recovery allowed in two of five cases. None of the three cases which denied recovery when the
sole purpose of the sterilization operation was to limit family size took note of the benefits rule,
and in one, the court did not disapprove of recovery, but the evidence indicated that no
negligence had occurred. Bennett v. Graves, 557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1977).
112. "Where the mother survives without casualty there is still some loss. She must spread
her society, comfort, care, protection and support over a larger group. If this change in the family
status can be measured economically it should be... compensable ... ." Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
113. In Martinean v. Nelson, - Minn. - , 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976) and Christensen
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vated an existing condition, 114 the jury may reasonably find that the benefit is
of little offsetting value in relation to the trauma experienced.
The same leeway should exist when the sterilization is performed because of
emotional fears of giving birth to a deformed child,115 Special factors to
consider would include the degree of mental suffering during the pregnancy
and the condition of the wrongfully conceived child. In Doerr v. Villate, 116 for
example, the plaintiff's husband underwent a vasectomy because both of their
children had been born retarded. 1 7 The wrongfully conceived child was also
born retarded as well as physically deformed. 118 Circumstances such as those
in Doerr should present no problem in allowing a substantial recovery for
childrearing costs because the mental suffering is undoubtedly great and
because the condition of the wrongfully conceived child causes substantial
harm to a plaintiff who already has two handicapped children. In such cases,
the jury is best left with the freedom to weigh the mitigating effect, if any, of
the benefit conferred against the harm suffered. 119 A jury in other cases,
however, should be able to decide that the birth of a healthy child is an
overriding benefit to a couple, whether their prior children were deformed 120
or healthy. 121
When financial hardship, the desire to limit family size, or both (as is often
the case)' 22 are the motivations for undergoing sterilization, the benefits of
v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) the feared adverse effects of pregnancy did not
actually occur.
114. See, e.g., Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, - Mich. App. -, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978) (crippled mother, history of difficult pregnancy and delivery, suicide threat-
ened after learning of pregnancy); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976)
(birth of twins, one of whom suffered from congenital birth defects, following tubal ligation
performed on woman with history of diabetes, difficult pregnancy, and miscarriage); Teeters v.
Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974) (severe complications of pregnancy).
115. For a list of such cases, see note 111 supra.
116. 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
117. Id. at 334, 220 N.E.2d at 768.
118. Id.
119. For examples of cases presenting fact situations in which such a mitigating effect may be
found, see Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514
S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Garwood v.
Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
120. This was the case in Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972). On the other hand, a
jury should be just as free to place a higher value on the pain and suffering of pregnancy and the
attendant anxiety over the possible birth of another deformed child than on the benefit of the
birth of a healthy child.
121. In Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenr. Ct. App. 1974), three of plaintiff's
children were born with congenital hip problems. The pregnancy following the wrongful
conception resulted in the birth of a healthy child. In such a case, however, because the plaintiff
had previously borne healthy children, in addition to those born with deformities, the benefit of
the birth of another healthy child may not be valued highly. In Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d
892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), the plaintiff was a social worker, whose work with deformed children
had caused her to form overwhelming fears of giving birth to a deformed child. Because sle
already had two healthy children and suffered a tremendous degree of emotional trauma during
the pregnancy following the wrongful conception, the subsequent birth of a healthy child would
seem to be of little benefit to her.
122. For a list of such cases, see note 111 supra.
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parenthood are unlikely to outweigh the injury suffered. The benefits rule
would also provide the flexibility to find the benefit overriding if sudden relief
from financial hardship or a reduction in family size occurs between the time of
the sterilization operation and the ensuing pregnancy, thereby eliminating the
original reasons for the sterilization.' 2 3
In cases involving several reasons for sterilization,' 24 the calculation of the
offset for the benefits of parenthood should be made as follows. First, the
factfinder should determine the offset that would be awarded with respect to
each reason, as if that were the only reason for undergoing sterilization in the
particular case. Then, a percentage should be assigned for each of the several
reasons according to the relative part each played in the total decision to be
sterilized and applied to the offset values first determined. The sum of these
products will determine the total offset.
If, for example, in a case of sterilization for therapeutic and family-size
reasons, the total damages amount to $200,000, the factfinder might deter-
mine that an offset of $60,000 should be awarded when the reason for
sterilization is therapeutic,' 2s and that an offset of $10,000 should be awarded
when the reason is to limit family size. The factfinder may then find that the
therapeutic reason accounted for 80% of the decision to be sterilized, and that
the family-size reason accounted for 20% of the decision. The total offset
would then amount to $50,000, consisting of $48,000 (80% of $60,000)
awarded on the basis of the therapeutic reason and $2,000 (20% of $10,000)
awarded on the basis of the family-size reason. The plaintiff's net recovery
would therefore amount to $150,000.
In general, to aid both the trial court and any appellate court, the jury
should be required to return a special verdict, specifying, as in the example
above, the various amounts arrived at in the determination of the damage
award.' 26 The use of a special verdict would permit a careful examination of
the different amounts allocated to damage and benefit' 2 7 and would be of
great value in preventing excessive awards. 28
CONCLUSION
Modern trends emphasizing the individual's right not to have children have
eroded past objections to actions for wrongful conception. When this funda-
mental right has been violated as a result of a physician's negligence or breach
of warranty, a remedy should be provided. The recognition of a right to
recover may actually result in less litigation once physicians obtain a fully
informed consent and perform proper post-operative testing. Furthermore,
difficulty in calculating damages does not justify denial of the remedy,
123. In the usual case, however, the family has suffered great harm by the birth of another
child and should be fully compensated.
124. For a list of such cases, see note II1 supra.
125. This figure might be much lower if the pregnancy severely aggravated the existing health
problem.
126. This is now standard practice in Minnesota in wrongful conception cases. Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. - , - , 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1977); see Martineau v. Nelson,
- Minn. , n.18, 247 N.W.2d 409, 417 n.18 (1976).
127. Martineau v. Nelson, - Minn. - n.18, 247 N.W.2d 409, 417 n.18 (1976).
128. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. -, -, 260 N.W.2d 1b9, 176 (1977).
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especially when the difficulty results from the tortfeasor's conduct. Rea-
sonably ascertainable gudelines do exist to facilitate a case-by-case determi-
nation of the gravity of the harm.
Judicial mechanisms must evolve to keep pace with changes in societal
values and standards of conduct, and courts should not blindly administer
precedents based on outdated policies. Innovation. not intellectual rigidity,
is the hallmark of a judiciary responsive to the changing values underlying the
legal system. An action for wrongful conception involves recognition of only
one more of the endless varieties of tortious conduct that violate legally
protected rights and that demand legal protection. Philip Braverman
